This essay discusses the idea that a Theory of Everything would not be complete without a theory of consciousness as one of its parts, and the suggestion that new physics may be needed to describe consciousness. I argue that the motivations behind searching for such a theory arise as the result of misunderstandings over the use of language when talking about consciousness.
Introduction
Consciousness in physics is a subject rarely written about by physicists themselves. Discussion is usually limited to a few sentences -just the statement of opinion. This maybe because most people believe that if they started to argue the conversation would never end, and a lot of the time this turns out to be about right. Opinions remain the same and arguments boil down to elaborate restatements of people's feelings on the matter. We end up saying "Well, I just think it's all nonsense" or "I just believe that consciousness must have a role here." But feelings like this are the raw material for philosophy, not philosophy itself. It is possible to get somewhere by bringing them to light, writing them down and analysing their sense. I believe this is worthwhile to do -if these feelings are left as just that and not looked at carefully, real errors can occur.
At a time when a Theory of Everything (TOE) is seen as within reach by some, people are beginning to think about what we can expect from such an idea: a total description of nature. So we need to know: does consciousness have a role here or not? Do we need a description of consciousness to complete the TOE? What does that even mean? What leads us to regard this as a possibility? We need clarity here, for practical reasons. It is useful to investigate the question of whether, as physicists, working on consciousness is a waste of time or not.
Thankfully there is not complete silence on the issue. Adrian Kent's paper [1] gives an account of an opinion I know to be held by many (indeed almost all who have expressed an opinion to me aside from flat denial), which I summarise below. Before doing so I should say that I agree with him that quantum mechanics does not have a special place in the discussion of consciousness in physics (since the Bohmian interpretation gives the theory in terms of classical type trajectories etc., I think the necessity of consciousness entering here specially can be denied outright).
The following then, centers on the motivations and ideas behind studying consciousness in physics. Firstly they are described (the "raw material" of philosophy). In the next section problems with the ideas are raised. Finally a philosophical treatment of the arguments is outlined, and the root of the problem is exposed with a view to freeing us from the problematic picture of consciousness.
The Problem
Why do some members of the physics community feel the need for some kind of theory of consciousness? What form do they imagine it taking? Don Page has said that we must have a theory of consciousness, as he can imagine a universe with the same laws of physics and initial conditions, but in which humans were in fact automatons. Another argument, to be found in Kent's paper, says that physics should explain all natural phenomena in terms of a simple model. Since, he says, consciousness is a natural phenomenon, and some aspects of it are quantifiable ( e.g. how many symbols can be held in mind at once) we should be able to come up with a mathematical model that covers these phenomena also. The problem with this is that statements about mental states do not seem to be transcribable into statements about some natural phenomena [1] :
... no one knows how to transcribe a statement of the form "I see a red giraffe" into a statement about the physical state of the speaker.
In this picture, it seems like this kind of statement is really a statement about a physical state, but there is somehow a veil drawn across this, that we could draw back to see the expression how it should be, if we were clever enough.
A second argument as to why we need the theory, is that consciousness enters into physics at a basic level anyway. Kent again:
All the data on which our theories are based ultimately derive from conscious impressions or memories of impressions. If our ideas about physics included no hypothesis about consciousness, we would have no way of deriving any conclusion about the data..."
The picture we have is this: what I "have" when I have a pain is just like a natural phenomenon, but just more difficult to get a grip of since only I am aware of it. But as scientists we think it a good assumption that our expressions of pain, etc. come from physical processes in the brain. This leads to the idea of psycho-physical paralellism: that our conscious impressions are correlated to physical processes (in the brain, presumably), so that we can describe each one by means of these processes. Thus the phenomena that only I see (called "epiphenomena") run alongside what we would traditionally call physical phenomena. Here we might be tempted to make statements like "This physical process is pain". Then we are under the impression that we can now transcribe any statement about a mental state into some statement about a physical state.
To set up a principle: a psycho-physical paralellism on brain-process that can include all the conscious impressions of a human should be possible. Even though no-one knows how this works exactly, they are still enthusiastic about the usefulness of this statement. It is argued in [1] that the principle requires that enough is happening in the brain at any time to represent the full range of conscious sensation.
Already a problem arises, which is used as another reason why we should further study consciousness in physics. In constructing our psycho-physical paralellism we have merely added the conscious phenomena alongside some of the physical. They affect nothing physical in themselves. How then is it that we feel uneasy (bad) when in danger, pain (bad) when we are damaged etc. as if our mental states had been tailored by evolution? If these states are just arbitrarily correlated this seems confusing. Kent says:
There are really only two serious possibilities. One is that psychophysical paralellism cannot be made precise and that consciousness is simply scientifically inexplicable. The other is that consciousness is something that interacts, if perhaps very subtly, with the rest of the material world, rather than simply passively existing alongside that world.
The possibility that we have already made a mistake is not considered.
The Problem with the Problem
The setup for theories of consciousness outlined above seems reasonable enough; it is where the mind of a physicist is usually lead when considering the issue. But the psycho-physical paralellism leads to seemingly intractable problems, the issue slips out of our grasp as we try to say anything exact, and some of the arguments can be seen to be circular. In this section I will sometimes compare the arguments of paralellism to their analogs in behaviourism: the doctrine that mental states do not exist (or that we should never mention them in science). I do not hold this view, but the comparisons can be revealing. I describe headaches that arise from the above, resulting mostly from just pushing the reasoning to the next sensible question.
Firstly, let me point out a puzzle in the "automaton" motivation for a theory of consciousness. If the laws of physics are the same in this other universe full of automaton humans (and we assume that consciousness does not affect the physical laws), then all physical events are the same. Can anyone explain, then, why the automaton Don Page in that universe is expounding theories of consciousness? This is one of those questions that shows how slippery the issue is.
The other motivations lead to similar confusion when questioned. How will the psycho-physical paralellism help the second problem with the status quothat all data derives from conscious impressions? What do we even expect as an answer to this? Well, paralellism gives us a process (on which to pin conscious impressions) in the physical world -but this process depends on our physical theories, derived from conscious impressions! This approach looks circular here.
As to being able to give a mathematical framework for questions such as "How many black spots can this man visualize at once", the paralellism does not have the jump on behaviourists. They would just rephrase as "How many black spots does this man say he can visualize?" since there is no other way the man could demonstrate his visualization here. They would then be able to answer their question easily. Would a group working with a psycho-physical paralellism expect a different result? Of course not. The statement of the man might even be used to define their paralellism.
The same applies to the uses of the principle of paralellism stated above: most people would agree that if a man could recount a set A of memories of a particular period, the brain processes in that period should have been able to encode all the data in A. What more does one expect from the paralellism?
Finally, a commonsense enquiry into the "possibility" of consciousness affecting physics leaves us with total nonsense. It's all very well to talk about this and leave the details for later, but what would happen if we did detect such a thing? What would it mean to say that consciousness behaves in this way, influences physical phenomena? Some new physics in the brain? Well, what we would see, surely, is new physical phenomena. Now we need a new psychophysical paralellism to relate this to consciousness! (And the evolution problem is not solved; we still do not know why some of these phenomena correspond to feeling good and others bad). You could call these new phenomena "effects of consciousness" if you liked, but this would amount to nothing more than word play, as if I called Ahab's raising of his arm an effect of his consciousness instead of the result of a physical process. That is not the game that physicists play.
Turning Away from the Picture
What's going wrong here? I believe that the clearest diagnosis of how we have been mislead is to be found in [2] . A central quotation from this book:
The Paradox disappears only when we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts -which may be about houses, pains, good or evil, or anything else you please.
Scientists like generalities. They are to a large extent what we deal in. Unfortunately when this overlaps into philosophy it seems to degenerate into thinking of a generality, and then forcing everything into it by stretching definitions. It is like saying "All tools serve to modify something" and then, when confronted with a ruler, either saying "Well, that serves to modify our knowledge of lengths" or "I will not consider a ruler to be a tool from now on". This doesn't get us anywhere. In the same way we might think "Words serve to name things -they correspond to parts of the world" and on being asked about some mental state, say pain, saying "Well, it names something that only I can see -something in the mental world." Already we have entered the hall of mirrors that leads to the above confusion.
The expression of pain, recollection, imagining a red giraffe, or any other such thing is not exactly the same as the description of a phenomenon. The grammar of the two cases is different -their identification is misleading. Knowing for example, that you have a pain cannot be made the same as knowing you have a cow. It makes sense to say "I thought I had a cow but in fact I do not" -but what about "I thought I had a pain but in fact I did not"? We need to examine the uses of the words to get back to dry ground. This is how we get into this mess: once we picture a pain as a thing in this way, and note that physics means to describe all things, we feel that it should cover these new things also. We have mistaken a turn of phrase for the discovery of a new phenomenon. We think that we should be able to describe these things more closely to get a better understanding of them, like we might with a cow. A useful analogy helps to clarify the problems with this picture [2] :
... Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a beetle. No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something quite different in his box. One might imagine such a thing constantly changing. But suppose the word beetle had a use in these peoples language? If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. No, one can divide through by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation of the model of "object and designation" the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.
It is not useful to think of mental states in this way. It leads to a dead end, and no more can be said about them than previously. We are banging our heads on a limit of language. This reveals a mistake in our idea of how language works here. It is not a case of something being beyond our present ability to describe phenomena -it is nothing to do with our ability to describe phenomena (consider the different grammar of these two situations: describing a cow; describing a pain).
One thing must be made clear: these arguments are not meant to deny any proposition. They do not portray a proposed fact as fiction. Wittgenstein says "If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction." What is meant is to question our picture of language and sense here. This is different form behaviourism. It makes perfect sense to say "When this happens in my brain, I feel pain" (if that were indeed the case). What is in question is the need for a paralellism and its place in physical law. What I have discussed above is basically a criticism of the first motivation for the paralellism.
The second motivation (that all knowledge of the world comes form sensation, so that we must describe them by means of the paralellism) can also be seen to arise from a misunderstanding of the use of language. If someone were to say "I have a sensation of seeing a red giraffe" instead of "I see a red giraffe" we would probably think "What a strange turn of phrase." Language is a social thing that depends on our mutual acceptance and use of it. We learn the use of phrases like the latter from pointing and defining, and similar things -we do not make up the words privately to describe private sensations (in fact a section of [2] is given over to showing the concept of such a language to be nonsense). Thus when we say "The electric current has flowed in accordance with Maxwell's equations" we do not need anything we do not already have.
We need to turn away from the troublesome picture. Then the problem of evolution and our emotions does not arise. There is no more reason to look for new physics in the brain than anywhere else. Our motivations for doing so are based on a grammatical fiction.
Conclusion
It would be impossible to take away some people's motivation, when questioned about their sensations, to say something like "Yes, but only I have THIS!". The point of the arguments outlined is that these kinds of expressions are meaningless (in the above case, Wittgenstein comments that emphatic stressing of "this" is not a definition if you are not pointing to anything), and any structure built on this basis will be too. This is not to deny the value of life or the wonder of our existence in any way. In fact I believe that the approach is much friendlier to these values than any approach given by paralellism. If we accept that a statement about phenomena cannot be transcribed into one about morality, then comments like "We have evolved to be aggressive, therefore we ought to be" (or disguised forms of this) can be seen to be nonsense and discounted immediately.
An essay like this is necessarily brief and cannot contain a full explanation of the ideas in [2] . Still, the fact that these ideas are not generally considered in the physics community (and that most books on the subject are written for philosophy students rather that scientists), gives hope that the above could be useful to those physicists willing to discuss the issue.
